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Religious Associational Rights and Sexual Conduct in
South Africa: Towards the Furtherance of the
Accommodation of a Diversity of Beliefs
Shaun de Freitas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Michel Rosenfeld speaks of a radical post-modern attack on the
Enlightenment tenet, namely the clear separation between the realm
of reason and that of faith. The post-modern challenge builds on the
“disenchantment of reason” associated with the perception that
reason as the means to the implantation of a universally justified
rational order gives way to purely instrumental reason (the use of
reason for purposes of advancing the narrow interests of the
powerful). 1 With the rise of religion and also the disenchantment of
reason, religion finds more room to project its truth as absolute and
exclusive.2 This gives way to the realization that, just as there are
different beliefs, there are also different forms of reason coupled to
these different beliefs. Human rights protection includes the
necessity to agree upon certain fundamentals. This, however, should
not negate circumstances that allow for a more sensitive and
accommodative approach regarding a diversity of supportive
arguments pertaining to moral matters. In this regard, how we
understand concepts such as “equality,” 3 “human dignity” 4 and

* Professor of Law, Department of Constitutional Law and Philosophy of Law,
University of the Free State, South Africa. The author would like to thank Iain Benson for
comments on a previous draft. An earlier version of this article was delivered as a paper at the
Nineteenth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium, held on October 7–9, 2012 at
the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University.
1. Michel Rosenfeld, Introduction: Can Constitutionalism, Secularism and Religion Be
Reconciled in an Era of Globalization and Religious Revival?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2333, 2335
(2009).
2. Id. at 2336.
3. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 29–30
(2010); ROGER TRIGG, EQUALITY, FREEDOM, AND RELIGION 152 (2012).
4. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 3, at 177–82.
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“freedom” 5 may differ from believer to believer and from one group
of believers sharing the same core beliefs to another group of
believers sharing the same core beliefs. For example, there are those
of the view that equality necessitates that religious associations may
not deny membership to persons practicing same-sex sexual
conduct, even where such conduct is in violation of the core tenets of
such associations. However, such an understanding of equality does
not enjoy universal support (or universal persuasion). Society is
composed of many sub-communities of various institutional kinds,
and the liberty of these many sub-communities to exist and to
operate according to the kinds of communities they are should be
protected. 6
Johan van der Vyver recently commented that there is much
stress placed on the self-determination of religious associations
regarding their internal functioning. Van der Vyver adds that:
“Religious perceptions and practices that have lost touch with the
times can best be remedied through deliberation and persuasion;
legal coercion in matters of faith is bound to be counterproductive.” 7
Van der Vyver made this statement in the context of current
approaches in German jurisprudence where the labor courts are only
required to take account of the effect of the dismissal of an employee
on his or her personal and family life and to ask whether the
consequences of the employee’s conduct with regard to the spiritual
calling of the church was of such a nature as to justify the negative
effects his or her dismissal would have on his or her personal and
family life or religious freedom. 8 The reference here to “deliberation
and persuasion” as trumping “legal coercion” poses challenges
towards qualifying the parameters of appointments by, and
membership to, religious associations. Will persuasion always be
possible? Should persuasion always be required? Are there not

5. Id. at 27–28; see also TRIGG, supra note 3, at 139.
6. STEVEN M. TIPTON, PUBLIC PULPITS: METHODISTS AND MAINLINE CHURCHES IN THE
MORAL ARGUMENT OF PUBLIC LIFE 435–36 (2007).
7. Johan D. van der Vyver, State Interference in the Internal Affairs of Religious Institutions, 26
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2012).
8. Id. at 9. This is, according to van der Vyver, due to the influences from approaches
taken by the European Court of Human Rights relating to the dismissal of church employees for
sexual conduct considered by the respective churches to be violations of those churches’ core
doctrines. Id. at 1–2.
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different forms of persuasion that oppose one another on moral
matters? Who should be persuaded?
According to Nicholas Rescher, the empirical basis of our factual
knowledge is bound to cultivate different forms of “alternative
cognitive positions through the variation of experience,” which in
turn leads to rational inquiries of different results. 9 It is therefore
normal that people with different experiences should judge
differently with respect to issues that are not in themselves very
simple, 10 and for this reason, dissensus and pluralism overrides the
quest for consensus. 11 These alternative cognitive positions which
include rational inquiries of different results are also represented by
religious associations. With reference to Canadian and South African
jurisprudence, it has been commented that the legal claims for
accommodation that are not viewed as challenging the lexical
superiority of “constitutional religion” itself, stand a fair chance of
success. However, this is in contrast to the substantial reluctance of
the judiciary (and the legislature) to accept as authoritative any
potentially competing legal order that originates in sacred sources of
authority. 12 Stephen Carter comments that the liberal image of the
religiously devout citizen seems to be one of an individual whose

9. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PLURALISM: AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS 76–77 (1993).
Rescher adds that as long as people think themselves to have good reason for making different
assessments, consensus (however attractive) is not realistic—“This normality of dissensus of
values, ideals, aims, and aspirations prevails among people, engenders a pluralism in cognitive,
practical, doctrinal, and even political regards, which in turn inheres in the human condition.”
Id. at 132.
10. Id. at 77.
11. Id. at 125–26. This quest for consensus is also found in the strand of liberalist
thinking that views toleration as an instrument of rational consensus (where the diversity of
ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to disappear). In this regard, John Gray
states
Liberalism contains two philosophies. In one, toleration is justified as a means to
truth. In this view, toleration is an instrument of rational consensus, and a diversity
of ways of life is endured in the faith that it is destined to disappear. In the other,
toleration is valued as a condition of peace, and divergent ways of living are welcomed
as marks of diversity in the good life. The first conception supports an ideal of
ultimate convergence on values, the latter an ideal of modus vivendi. Liberalism’s
future lies in turning its face away from the ideal of rational consensus and looking
instead to modus vivendi.
JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 105 (2000).
12. Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diversity,
Restricting Competition, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2535, 2536 (2009).
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moral knowledge proceeds from a privileged insight that others do
not or cannot share. 13 The same applies to points of view by
religious associations on moral matters.
This therefore directly impacts the rights of religious
associations in the context of the rationale by such associations to
prohibit employment or membership of persons who practice sexual
conduct that is in opposition to the tenets of such associations. This
in turn has implications for the flourishing of diversity in pluralist
and democratic societies. South African scholarship poses questions
as to whether same-sex sexual conduct should be accommodated
(whether by means of membership or appointments) within
religious associations where the core belief (or beliefs) of such
associations prohibit same-sex sexual conduct by its members or
appointees. This forms part of the challenges confronting many
religious associations due to a more diversified polity, which
increases the risk of flattening out the confessional and theological
integrity of particular churches into what Steven Tipton refers to as
the “moral Esperanto of legal procedures [and] ‘rights talk.’” 14
Bearing the above in mind, this Article addresses the importance
of religious associational rights, also with special reference to the
South African jurisprudential context. This is due to a recent
development in the South African judiciary where the services of an
appointee to a religious association were terminated by the
association due to the appointee participating in same-sex sexual
conduct, such conduct being in violation of the core doctrine of the
religious association. After having looked at the various South
African scholarly approaches in this regard, this article emphasizes

13. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 941–42
(1989). Carter also states that
Many people who are religiously devout derive at least large parts of their world view
from an epistemology that is very different from the materialist epistemology on
which empirical morality depends. So the problem of thinking of scientism as a
neutral mediating force is that the effort to turn moral questions into empirical ones
actually devalues some modes of thinking—particularly the religious mode . . . The
current liberal message to people whose moral judgments have religious roots is that
they are not welcome in public dialogue until they start speaking the same language
as everyone else.
Stephen L. Carter, Lecture One: The Uses of Empiricism and the Uses of Fanaticism, 69 OR. L. REV.
471, 492–93 (1990).
14. TIPTON, supra note 6, at 44, 284.
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the importance of allowing for a substantial level of autonomy
pertaining to religious associational rights. Following on this, critical
perspectives on the relationship between the arguments presented
by religious associations in qualification of their activities (which
includes the parameters allowed for membership and appointments)
and the persuasive force of such arguments in the context of rational
requirements and expectations are presented. The assumed
superiority of a point of view that arises from a non-religious point
of departure over a point of view that is based on a religious point of
departure is questioned. Accepting the view that a proper degree of
autonomy should be awarded to the religious association to function
as it deems fit is of much assistance towards the accommodation of
the reasons for such functioning. At the same time, bringing to light
the rationality of a religious association’s reason for acting in the
way it does provides us with a renewed sense of the autonomy to be
granted to a religious association in its functioning. These insights
are of importance to the improvement of diversity in pluralist and
democratic societies.
II. RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONTEXT

A. Associational Rights as Foundational
Associational rights (with special focus on religious associations,
which are important constituents of civil society 15) overlap with
interests and concerns supportive of the accommodation of diversity
within society. 16 More sensitivity towards religious associational

15. Justice Sachs, of the South African Constitutional Court, acknowledges the
importance of religious associations as part of civil society:
[R]eligion provides . . . a framework for . . . social stability and growth. . . .
Religious bodies play a large and important part in public life, through schools,
hospitals and poverty relief programmes. They command ethical behaviour from their
members and bear witness to the exercise of power by state and private agencies; they
promote music, art and theatre; they provide halls for community activities, and
conduct a great variety of societal activities for their members and the general public.
They are part of the fabric of public life, and constitute active elements of the diverse
and pluralistic nation contemplated by the Constitution. . . . Religious
organisations constitute important sectors of national life.
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, [2005] ZACC 19, ¶¶ 89–90 (CCT) (S. Afr.).
16. Maurizio Viroli speaks of a culture of citizenship that is cultivated not by means of
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rights leads to a more nuanced insight of the different forms of
rationality in society, each of these forms providing a unique
interpretation of certain foundational concepts. Not to do so will
result in a large sector of civil society having to compromise and in
the process having its freedom and identity weakened. This is
important, bearing in mind that religion is not only a set of doctrines
and exercises; it is people manifesting a collective concern for the
ultimate meaning and purpose of life—it is a shared intuition of and
commitment to transcendent values.17 Religion is not only
individual and private; in many instances religion exists in
communities, and individuals are members of wider religious
communities. 18 Civil society represents a plethora of morally-driven
interests and exchanges based on specific beliefs, and it includes
different forms of persuasion (to selected individuals and groups of
individuals sharing the same core beliefs) in justification of certain

universal political principles applied to specific cultures, not by dispersing particular cultures
throughout a common universal political frame, not by strengthening the cultural homogeneity
of different groups, but by encouraging many civic traditions within different groups. MAURIZIO
VIROLI, REPUBLICANISM 102 (Anthony Shugaar, trans., Hill & Wang 2002) (1999). See also
WILLIAM JOHNSON EVERETT, GOD’S FEDERAL REPUBLIC: RECONSTRUCTING OUR GOVERNING SYMBOL
19 (1988); TIPTON, supra note 6, at 430–31; William Galston, Religion and the Limits of Liberal
Democracy, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 41, 49 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004); Terrance Sandalow, A Skeptical Look at
Contemporary Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523, 535 (1989); Danie F.M. Strauss, Public Justice:
Delimiting the Task of Government in the Thought of Dooyeweerd and Chaplin, 44 J. FOR CHRISTIAN
SCHOLARSHIP 157, 176 (2008).
17. John O. Cole, Symposium: The Secularization of the Law, 31 MERCER L. REV. 401, 403
(1980). Max Stackhouse comments that faith inevitably articulates a “‘metaphysical-moral
vision’ about what is ‘really real.’ If taken at all seriously, it serves as a guide to meaningful
living. It shapes, over time, the ethos, that subtle web of values, meanings, purposes,
expectations, obligations, and legitimations that constitutes the publicly operating norms of a
civilization.” Max Stackhouse, An Ecumenist’s Plea for a Public Theology, 8 THIS WORLD,
Spring/Summer 1984, at 49. This in turn is of relevance for the protection of human dignity.
Human dignity as including psychological significance, is violated when there are attacks on
personal beliefs and ways of life, as well as attacks on groups and communities with which
individuals are affiliated. Respect for the intrinsic worth of a person requires a recognition that
the person is entitled to have his or her beliefs, attitudes, ideas and feelings. Coercive measures
(including psychological) to change personal beliefs is, according to Oscar Schachter, as striking
an affront to the dignity of the person as physical abuse or mental torture. Oscar Schachter,
Editorial Comment: Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 850 (1983). See
also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion
Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 295 (2008); Robert P. George, Religious Liberty and the Human Good,
5 INT’L J. REL. FREEDOM 35, 39 (2012).
18. TRIGG, supra note 3, at 47.
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actions taken by the constituent parts of civil society. The protection
of the autonomy of the entities comprising civil society results in
sensitivity to the rationale used by such entities in qualifying certain
modes of conduct. 19 In fact, the converse is also true. This is
especially true for religious associations, where the qualification of
prohibitions on appointments by, and membership to, religious
associations of persons practicing same-sex sexual conduct, where
such practices are contrary to the core doctrine of such associations,
are concerned. Appreciating the merits of religious reasoning results
in sensitivity to the autonomy of the religious association that
presents such reasoning. The value of this understanding for the
flourishing of interests (individual and associational) within civil
society is substantial, and the law has its role to play in this regard in
that it derives its authority from the premise that “it strives to
anticipate and give expression to what people believe to be their
collective destiny or ultimate meaning within a moral universe.” 20
The ideal for a flourishing of diversity 21 includes the recognition of
specific religious modes of understanding, which in turn nourishes
identity, self-realization and expression.
When appointments by, and membership to, religious
associations are not carried out in accordance with the wishes of a

19. A sensitivity to different modes of rationality (including religious modes) providing
added sensitivity towards the accommodation of the autonomy of religious associations will be
further elaborated upon in the second part of this Article. An in-depth analysis regarding
theories related to the qualification of the inherent or foundational importance of associational
rights (for example ideas emanating from the communitarian school of thinking or ideas related
to sphere sovereignty or the inherent importance of the idea of subsidiarity) does not form part
of the purpose of this Article. Current scholarship on associational rights is in dire need of a
reconsideration of such schools of thought, where associational rights are viewed as an ultimate
subject of moral value, just as liberalism supports the view that the individual is the ultimate
subject of moral value. See, e.g., DWIGHT NEWMAN, COMMUNITY AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: A
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS HELD BY GROUPS (2011). It suffices for purposes of this
article (as stated earlier) to accept that associational rights, especially those related to religious
associations, are of fundamental importance (and are widely supported).
20. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 256 (1984).
21. Needless to say, calls for the flourishing of society beg the question as to why
diversity should be valued, especially where it counters claims made by historically
disadvantaged groups. See Stu Woolman, On the Fragility of Associational Life: A Constitutive
Liberal’s Response to Patrick Lenta, 25 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 280, 286 (2009). This article is
based on the assumption that diversity is important and deems a further analysis in this regard
to be irrelevant to its purposes.
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collectivity of persons believing in the same core views on reality,
existence, and purpose, then we find some or other negative effect
countering the eternal pursuit of an ideal attainment of diversity.
Collectivities understood as the bearers of meaning 22 have their
meaning disrupted in instances where membership or appointments
are enforced from the outside, along lines of reasoning that are not
always in line with those of the religious association.
Against the background of the South African context, Lourens du
Plessis comments that the South African Constitution “leaves ample
room for the protection of the right to religious freedom as a group
right.” 23 There were important judgments of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa regarding the right to religious freedom that
gave a libertarian and individualist meaning to such a right, although
this need not imply a negation of any institutional issues related to
such a right. 24 Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar observe that South
Africa is one of the most accommodating jurisdictions in the world
regarding cultural diversity. However, “[w]hereas the South African
Constitutional Court has been more sympathetic to the claims of
difference than most of its counterparts worldwide, even such a
generous accommodation regime reaches its limits of toleration
22. Woolman, supra note 21, at 296.
23. Lourens M. du Plessis, Grondwetlike beskerming vir godsdiensregte as groepsregte in SuidAfrika, 43 NGTT 214, 214, 228 (2002). See also Stuart Woolman, Freedom of Association, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 62 (Woolman ed., since 2002). Referring to the South
African Constitutional Court’s case of Prince v. President, Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA 794
(CC), Woolman comments that the minority judgment recognizes how associations are
constitutive of the beliefs and practices of individuals and how the fact of their being
constitutive entitles them to constitutional protection. Id. at 63.
24. Du Plessis, supra note 23, at 228 (note that this article was published in 2002). Since
2002, the next landmark case on religious rights and freedoms was MEC for Education v. Pillay,
[2007] ZACC 21 (CCT) (S. Afr.). In this case, nothing substantial was stated regarding the
importance of associational rights, and Chief Justic Langa continued in the emphasis of the
individualist sense of religious rights. See, e.g., Pillay, [2007] ZACC at ¶ 143. However, Chief
Justice Langa also states that:
By including religion in section 31, the Constitution makes plain that when a group of
people share a religious belief, that group may also share associative practices that
have meaning for the individuals within that religious group. . . . In the case of an
associative practice, an individual is drawing meaning and identity from the shared or
common practices of a group. The basis for these practices may be a shared religion, a
shared language or a shared history. Associative practices, which might well be
related to shared religious beliefs, are treated differently by the Constitution because
of their associative, not personal character.
Id. at ¶ 145.
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when it encounters a challenge to its overarching reign over law’s
empire.” 25 South Africa’s human rights jurisprudence has a
substantial individualist approach that includes an emphasis on
religion as an “individual” (and private) thing. 26 Referring to the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Stu Woolman comments that
in fifteen years, the Court has never decided a case solely, or even
largely, in terms of freedom of association—“[a]nd that says quite a
lot about where, in our hierarchy of rights, freedom of association is
located.” 27
As stated earlier, an emphasis on, and prioritization of, religious
associational rights allows for more sensitivity towards the
accommodation of diverse forms of rationalization and persuasion,
each of which is based on a specific underlying belief. Claims in
support of associational rights are inextricably connected to claims of
persuasive reasoning held by the religious, and as reflected in the
core tenets of a religious association. Claims for the flourishing of
diversity include support for the accommodation of different forms
of reasoning so as to qualify certain modes of functioning by, among
others, religious associations. 28 But how important are associational
rights really?
Associational rights, understood as foundational to the
functioning of a pluralist and democratic society, have, for example,
enjoyed much support in terms of the principle of subsidiarity, 29
25. Hirschl & Shachar, supra note 12, at 2541–42.
26. This is similar to, for example, the position in Canada. According to the Ontario
Conference of Catholic Bishops, most judgments have failed to give a proper recognition to the
group dimension of religious liberty in Canada. Also according to the said conference, a proper
contextual reading and understanding of the purpose and nature of the values of the Canadian
Charter should have led to an interpretation that accords with maximal involvement of religious
projects both in the public sphere and as a group activity. IT Benson (Lawyer for the Intervener),
Factum for the Intervener, Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops, (Jan. 23, 2009), Ontario
Human Rights Commission and Connie Heintz (Respondents) and Christian Horizons
(Appellant) and Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops (Intervener); Ontario Superior Court of
Justice (Divisional Court), Court File No. 221/08, paragraph 45, page 21. The same is also the
case in the American jurisprudential milieu. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 17, at 286, 291.
27. Woolman, supra note 21, at 296. Ever since these comments by Woolman were made,
the position remains unchanged. For some critical remarks on the Canadian judiciary pertaining
to an emphasis on individual rights (to the exclusion of group rights) in religious matters, see
TRIGG, supra note 3, at 49. This has implications for the South Africa Constitutional Court’s
approach to such matters, as Canadian jurisprudence enjoys authority in that court.
28. Rationality and its connection to religious associations are dealt with later on.
29. This is the view that the smaller should not be dominated by the larger (the larger
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which is the assistance of the state towards having other entities in a
society achieve their legitimate purposes.30 This emphasis on the
importance of associational rights is further enhanced by views
pertaining to the law in a pluralist society, as well as by insights
related to the nature of the private versus the public and how the
individual’s human dignity relates to this. Margaret Davies, for
example, is of the view that pluralism includes the understanding
that the hierarchy of the law should be flattened—the law should be
viewed as a complex horizontal as well as vertical structure. 31 Also,
says Davies, the spatial diversity of law is to be found in an
irreducibly plural multicultural landscape, in non-essential social
groupings, and in the formation of identities in relation to such
multiple normative environments. 32 It is true that in popular and
legal-professional circles, law is generally defined as a body of norms
promulgated and enforced by the state. However, according to social
scientists, both public and private domains also produce their own

exists so as to further the proper functioning of the smaller) which is translated into
constitutional theory as an understanding that the state is posited as the entity that is to help
the smaller or lesser entities (for example, the entities of civil society).
30. See Stephen V. Monsma, The Relevance of Solidarity and Subsidiarity to Reformed
Social and Political Thought 4 (Paper Prepared for the International Society for the Study of
Reformed
Communities,
July
9–12,
2006),
available
at
http://www.calvin.edu/henry/ISSRC/Conferences/Papers/monsma06.pdf.
Regarding
the
importance of sphere sovereignty (which is a concept similar in meaning to that of subsidiarity),
see id. at 4–6.
31. Margaret J. Davies, Pluralism in Law and Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 72, 72, 94 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008).
32. D. Cooper cited in Davies, supra note 31, at 94. Referring to Robert Cover’s Nomos and
Narrative, Davies refers to the associations of
normative meaning inhabited by religious sectarian communities . . . each
constructs its own nomos . . . The state is one element of such a nomos, but not
necessarily the most significant . . . State law is interpreted through religious
norms: thus, a plurality of possible meanings arises from law’s intersection with
various normative worlds and subject-positions. It is the task of legal officials, in
particular judges, to contain this plurality.
Id. at 94. See also id. at 96–97. Referring to the Canadian position, Benjamin Berger states that
law
is not a cultural understanding of religion. It does not seek to understand religion as
an interpretive horizon, composed of sets of symbols and categories of thought, out of
which meaning can be given to identity, history, and experience. Instead, it moulds
religion to the shape of its own set of normative and symbolic commitments.
Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 277, 310–11 (2007).
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distinctive norms—bodies of law, which the state may acknowledge
and enforce, or alternatively, refuse to recognize or even tolerate.
In its post-modern formulation, this theory of “legal pluralism”
holds that law need not originate with or be enforced by the state;
that law is imminent in all social and economic relations; and that
state law ought to be respectful of non-state normative systems,
which express the “otherness” of those who inhabit the plethora of
private and public domains that exist in any society or polity. 33 This
understanding of the plurality of the law also has relevance to our
understanding of pluralism as something that is to be “structural” or
“shared.” Iain Benson states that:
Pluralism can connote a kind of relativistic approach, as in “because
we are a pluralistic society, such and such a moral position cannot
have any public validity.” It does not have to mean this, however,
and . . . our linkage of a language of pluralism with a firm
commitment to group rights, for example, points us to a principled,
and what might be called structural or shared pluralism, rather than
one that is relativistic or, perhaps, totalistic. 34

When dealing with religious associations, for example, as part of
civil society, it is important to note that religion viewed as that
which should be relegated to the private sphere also has implications
for how we understand religious associational rights. Iain Benson
comments that if we are looking to discuss the relationship between
religion and other aspects of society, we must be careful to avoid
setting up false dichotomies. Religion discussed “in relation to the
state or within society” is a far cry, says Benson, from the frequently
used “religion and the state.” Benson explains that when we use the
“state” to mean the order of government and the law, and “society”
to mean citizens at large, including both religious and non-religious
citizens, we must remember that religion, in some sense, is within
both, since religious and non-religious citizens make up both the
state and society. 35 It is in this regard that caution is required
33. Harry Arthurs, The Re-Constitution of the Public Domain, in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN? GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER 85, 86–110 (Daniel Drache ed.,
2001).
34. IAIN T. BENSON, LIVING TOGETHER WITH DISAGREEMENT: PLURALISM, THE SECULAR, AND
THE FAIR TREATMENT OF BELIEFS IN CANADA TODAY 3 (2010) [hereinafter LIVING TOGETHER WITH
DISAGREEMENT].
35. Iain T. Benson, The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and
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regarding a too general and frequent usage of “public” versus
“private” when it comes to religious rights. In many instances, the
“private-religious” extends itself into the “public-belief” domain,
becoming a participant and representative of a specific belief in the
various areas of reality, which may include other participants and
representatives of other beliefs. If religion is understood as being
outside of the public sphere, then it is likely that it will be given a
different emphasis. On the other hand, if beliefs (including those
that are religious) are understood as being part of the public sphere
(due to their inextricable connection to the individual in his or her
activities in a private or public context), then the relevance of
religion takes on a whole new dimension. 36 This implies therefore
that religious associations also are to be viewed as part and parcel of
the public sphere, which in turn implies an acceptable level of
freedom for the manifestation of religion in the public sphere.
Richard Garnett comments that the importance of religious
associational rights finds confirmation in the individual’s freedom to
freely express and manifest his or her religion—“from the freeexercise or conscience rights of individual persons.” 37

Opportunities, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 111, 155 (2007).
36. Benson states: “In fact, all citizens are ‘in’ the public sphere and to characterize
religion as ‘outside’ the public perpetuates the error of anti-religious secularism—an ideology
that, from its inception intended to minimize the public space and involvement of religious
beliefs and religious projects.” Factum for the Intervener, Ontario Conference of Catholic
Bishops, 23 January 2009, Ontario Human Rights Commission and Connie Heintz (Respondents) and
Christian Horizons (Appellant) and Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops (Intervener); Ontario
Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court), Court File No. 221/08, paragraph 40, page 18. See
also LIVING TOGETHER WITH DISAGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 9; Iain T. Benson, Taking Pluralism

and Liberalism Seriously: The Need to Re-Understand Faith, Beliefs, Religion, and Diversity in the Public
Sphere, 23 J. STUDY REL. 17, 22–25 (2010).
37. Garnett, supra note 17, at 293, 295. See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 116, 118–19, 158
(1989). Richard Moon states that religious belief lies at the core of the individual’s world view.
Richard Moon, Freedom of Religion under the Charter of Rights: The Limits of State Neutrality, 45
U.B.C. L. REV. 497, 507 (2012). This belief orients the individual in the world and provides a
moral framework for his or her actions. Id. Moreover, religious belief ties the individual to a
community of believers and is often the essential or defining association in her or his life. Id. In
the words of Moon,
If religion is an aspect of the individual’s identity, then when the state treats his or
her religious practices or beliefs as less important or less true than the practices of
others, or when it marginalizes her or his religious community in some way, it is not
simply rejecting the individual’s views and values, it is denying her or his equal
worth.
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Associational rights therefore remain important, especially in the
context of the furtherance of diversity in societies where the
improvement of pluralism and democracy remain high on the
agenda. The importance of associational rights is also furthered in
the understanding (as referred to above) that the spatial diversity of
law is to be found in an irreducibly plural multicultural and multifaith environment, in non-essential social groupings, and in the
formation of identities in relation to such multiple normative
environments. Added to this is an understanding of the private
versus the public domains as more integrated with one another, also
in the context of the protection of the individual’s human dignity,
which includes the experience and manifestation of religious belief
(both within and outside of the private domain).
The following sections reference recent developments in South
African jurisprudence regarding religious associational rights, more
specifically pertaining to appointments by, and membership to, a
religious association in relation to matters of the personal sexual
conduct of such appointees or members. From this arises the
proposal that religious associational rights pertaining to membership
to, and appointments by, a religious association in the context of
same-sex sexual conduct, be given sufficient autonomy. This also has
implications for other forms of sexual conduct in the context of
membership and appointments to religious associations. Not only is
this argued for based on the importance of associational rights per se
(and as referred to earlier), but also in the context of understanding
religious reasons as substantially competitive with non-religious
reasons regarding the matter of membership to, and appointments
by, religious associations in the context of specific forms of sexual
conduct as substantial criteria for a determination of whether such
membership or appointments should be allowed by the respective
religious associations.

B. Religious Associational Rights and Sexual Conduct
In Johan Daniel Strydom v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente
Moreleta Park38 (referred to as Strydom) the applicant, Mr. Strydom,
Id.
38. [2008] ZAEQC 1 (EqC) (S. Afr.).

433

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/29/2014 9:52 AM

2013

was appointed as an independent contractor (organ teacher) by the
respondent; namely, the “Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk” (Dutch
Reformed Church) to teach music to students at the arts academy of
the congregation. The church terminated Mr. Strydom’s services
when it was discovered that he was involved in a same-sex
relationship. 39 Mr. Strydom instituted proceedings in terms of the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
(2000) against the church, as he was not an employee and he could
therefore not proceed in terms of the Labour Relations Act (1995) or
the Employment Equity Act (1998). The Equality Court found that
the church had discriminated unfairly against Mr. Strydom and
ordered the church to apologize to him, pay him R75000,00 for
emotional suffering, pay him the balance of his contract for 2005
amounting to R11970,00, and pay his legal fees. The church relied
on section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 (the right to freedom of religion 40) to justify the
“discrimination.” The respondents argued that the complainant was
“a spiritual leader and as such cannot by way of his example of living
in a homosexual relationship deliver his services as lecturer in music
at the church’s [art academy]. In other words, as a role model the
complainant was to follow an exemplary Christian lifestyle.” 41
According to Justice Basson, there was no convincing evidence
presented by the church that the complainant was in a position of
“spiritual leadership.” 42 The Court also found that the complainant
was not even a member of the church, was not an employee of the
church (he was merely a contract worker) and therefore the
complainant, according to the Court, “was . . . removed or
distanced from the church, and did not even participate in its
activities.” 43 Also, the Court was of the view that: “The right to

39. Here it is important to note that the respondent omitted, when appointing the
applicant, to make it clear that same-sex sexual conduct is in opposition to the tenets of the said
church. This was emphasized in Strydom. However, this does not form the crux of this
investigation, rather, the question is as to how far a religious institution may go regarding
appointments and membership, and in this regard, Strydom allows for furtherance of the debate.
40. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. OF 1996, ch. 2, § 15, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf (“Everyone has the right to
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”).
41. Strydom, [2008] ZAEQC at ¶ 16.
42. Id. at ¶ 17.
43. Id. at ¶ 20. Justice Basson added that: “There is also not a shred of evidence that the
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equality of the complainant must . . . be balanced against the
freedom of religion of the church” 44 and that
The question remains whether the right to religious freedom
outweighs the Constitutional imperative that there must not be
unfair discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? The
Constitutional right to equality is foundational to the open and
democratic society envisaged by the Constitution. As a general
principle therefore, the Constitution will counteract rather than
reinforce unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation. 45

South African scholarship resulting from the Strydom case is
comprised basically of three main streams of thought. Firstly, there
is the view that a church should accommodate those who practice
same-sex sexual conduct due to an understanding of equality as
uniformly supportive in this regard. According to this view, no
matter what the nature of the functions to be exercised by an
appointment, a church should appoint a person who practices samesex sexual conduct. 46 In this regard it is argued that, for example, it
seems clearly justifiable for a Christian community to refuse to
employ a Jewish or Muslim minister, or any person who does not
profess the faith of that community, and this, says David Bilchitz, is

complainant wanted to influence the students or any other church member. In fact, he wanted to
keep his homosexual relationship to himself as he regarded it as a private matter.” Id. at ¶ 22.
See also id. at ¶ 17. This led Justice Basson to come to the conclusion that “it would not have
been devastating to the church to keep the complainant on in his teaching position.” Id. at ¶ 23.
From this it can be deduced that according to Justice Basson, where a religious association
appoints someone who is not “distanced” from the relevant religious community or church (and
which consequently has the power to exert some sort of influence on the members of the
religious institution), then such a church should have the freedom to exclude such a person
from membership or services to the church.
44. Id. at ¶ 8.
45. Id. at ¶ 14. Although being sensitive to the church’s authority to determine whom to
appoint when it comes to religious duties or functions related to spiritual leadership, Justice
Basson here implies that the prohibition of unfair discrimination due to sexual orientation (as
inferred from the “equality” clause in the Constitution) should be elevated to a more superior
norm than that of the right of a religious association to have absolute freedom to appoint whom
it wishes. The credibility of this type of reasoning when compared to the reasoning of a religious
association in the context of its religious ethos is critically addressed in the second part of this
article.
46. In this regard, Bilchitz’s argument is not confined only to being supportive towards
appointments by religious associations of those who practice same-sex sexual conduct but also
to membership of religious associations.
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based on the idea of “religius leadership.” However, according to
Bilchitz, “[t]his is a different matter altogether from refusing to
employ a . . . gay individual as a minister where such individual
belongs to such a community, professes its beliefs and identifies
with that community.” 47 Bilchitz also strongly relies on “biological
inherency” as reason for being orientated towards participating in
same-sex sexual conduct and that it is therefore not based solely on
choice. 48 Bilchitz uses biological inherency in furthering the claim
that religious associations may not prohibit membership or
appointments even where such conduct is in opposition to the core
tenets of such an association.
Secondly, there is the view that religious institutions should not
be forced to appoint persons practicing same-sex sexual conduct,
where such persons are expected to perform a “core function” within
such an institution. When a church wants to appoint someone who
practices same-sex sexual conduct, and such an appointment is not
aligned with a core function in the church (such as a secretary for
example), then such a person needs to be accommodated. 49 In this
regard, Patrick Lenta refers to “economic opportunity” as a reason
for allowing persons to be appointed by religious associations when
such appointments entail functions that are not linked to the core
tenets or to spiritual leadership of the religious association. 50
Thirdly, there is the view that a religious association represents a
unique and important ethos (especially and foremost to its
members), and that membership to such an ethos requires one to
adhere to the core tenets of such an institution irrespective of the
functions to be performed by a member or an appointee. Here it is
argued that the way we think of our bodies and the purposes for
which our bodies are to be used (including sexual activities) are

47. David Bilchitz, Should Religious Associations Be Allowed to Discriminate?, 27 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 219, 246 (2011). According to Bilchitz, a law that prevents a religious group from
discriminating on grounds of sexual-orientation should be defended. Id. at 240.
48. See, e.g., id. at 231.
49. See Patrick Lenta, Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious Associations and Work-Related
Discrimination, 126 S. AFR. L.J. 827–60 (2009). Interesting is that Lenta here also argues that,
contrary to Justice Basson’s view in the Strydom judgment, even teaching music is related to
spiritual influence in the church and can therefore be understood as constituting a religious
function or function of spiritual leadership in the church.
50. See id. at 859.
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inextricably connected to morally-based predilections. 51 It is also as
a result of the central meaning that marriage has for many, 52 that
sexual activity is such a central issue and core doctrine to many
believers, religious believers and religious associations. 53 A society
seeking the protection and furtherance of “identity” and “diversity”
needs to accommodate morally-based predilections regarding sexual
activity in the private sphere, which includes the religious
association. In this regard, an argument is also made for an approach
to appointments by religious associations, based on “religious ethos”
which does not necessarily exclude those functions that on the face
of it seem to be “distanced from religion” or “excluded from the
domain of spiritual influence or leadership.” How we perceive of
“distance” and “spiritual leadership” is in itself a matter of religious
interpretation sacred to the relevant collective belief. In other words,
the status of functions in a religious association that may, on the
face of it, appear to be distanced from spiritual leadership and core
doctrine, might in fact not be so on closer inspection. For example,
Alvin Esau explains that:
[U]nder the organic view of employment the employee is expected
to participate in the mission of the organization as a whole, and is
expected to join the whole community, the whole body, in a way
that transcends any narrowly defined job description. . . . [t]he
workplace itself constitutes a community of believers where
relationships are as important, if not more so, than narrowly
defined role tasks. . . . When you focus instrumentally on a role
you might well conclude that the religious organization should not
be allowed to discriminate on religious grounds when hiring
kitchen staff as opposed to professors. However, when you shift

51. See Shaun A. de Freitas, Freedom of Association as a Foundational Right: Religious
Associations and Strydom v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park, 28 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 258 (2012).
52. Marriage “also includes organic bodily union. This is because the body is a real part of
the person, not just his costume, vehicle, or property. Human beings are not properly
understood as nonbodily persons—minds, ghosts, consciousnesses—that inhabit and use
nonpersonal bodies. . . . Because persons are body-mind composites, a bodily union extends
the relationship of two friends along an entirely new dimension of their being as persons.” Sherif
Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
245, 253 (2011).
53. See also TRIGG, supra note 3, at 96.
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your perspective to the organic view, . . . relationships rather than
roles are to a degree the point of the enterprise. 54

This emphasizes “membership” of a religious institution as an
important factor, irrespective of the task expected of such a person—
the person (employee or independent contractor) is invited into a
relationship and into membership with the group, 55 and on
obtaining membership, the person becomes inextricably related to
the religious ethos of the relevant group which has a core relational
understanding
encompassing
it.
This
understanding
of
“membership” (in the context of the organic model) is also of
persuasive force to the members of such a congregation, and makes
perfect sense to each such member. 56
The Strydom judgment brings to the fore debate related to the
status of associational rights in South Africa, and in turn serves as a
catalyst for a consideration of the status of religious associational
rights in the context of appointments by, and membership to,
religious associations, where specific forms of sexual conduct are in
opposition to the core tenets of the religious association. In addition
to credible pillars of support for associational rights, such as sphere
sovereignty and the principle of subsidiarity, are valuable insights
pertaining to the status of the law, the nature of pluralism and the
relationship between the public and the private (as discussed above)
that also enhance the importance of religious associational rights in
the context of a substantial level of autonomy to be awarded to the
activities of a religious association.
An additional component in this regard is a critical analysis of
the points of rationality used in debates related to the parameters of
religious associational rights. For example, as mentioned above,
David Bilchitz views the prohibition of discrimination based on
sexual orientation as an encompassing norm that should be enforced
on all religious associations in South Africa, irrespective of their core
tenets. Patrick Lenta, on the other hand, aims at providing some sort
54. Alvin J. Esau, “Islands of Exclusivity”: Religious Organizations and Employment
Discrimination, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 719, 734 (2000) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 735. There can be many other examples—for example, the organic nature of a
religious association reflected in the core doctrine and mission of such an association requiring
the proclaiming of the Gospel to the world in all of the actions by all of its members.
56. Regarding further support of religious associations as “organic entities,” see Garnett,
supra note 17, at 292.
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of balance between the rights of the religious association and those
of the individual, where “economic opportunity” 57 serves as an
important factor in trying to accommodate those persons who do not
ascribe to the core tenets of the religious association from which
they are seeking employment. An argument was also made for a
higher degree of autonomy for a religious association in instances
where the religious ethos of a specific religious institution requires
it. From these three points of view, questions related to the
persuasive force of each arise and therefore require further analysis.
In the next section it will also be argued that the views of David
Bilchitz and of Patrick Lenta (as representative of South African
scholarship on the matter) reflect an assumed universality of rational
persuasion which are in fact, not of universal persuasion. This in
turn calls for a more accommodative approach to be taken towards
the reasons given by a religious association for the way in which it
functions.
III. RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF REASON

A. The Marginalization of Religious Language
There is currently, in what is referred to as “post-secular”
society, a growing realization that religion deserves its rightful place
in public debate without having to sacrifice its own “language.” This
is of relevance to the freedom that religious associations should have
in qualifying their ways of functioning. Consequently, this improves
the persuasive force of the religious language emanating from a
religious association. Certain sectors in liberalism are coming to
realize the subjectivity of discussions and reasoning clothed in socalled “neutral” (non-religious) language. The norms essential to the
sub-communities of interests within civil society are derived from
foundational beliefs (whether religious or non-religious), which in
turn represent what is rational to an individual believer or a group of
believers. 58 Liberalism’s privatization of religion, together with the
strict separation between the private and the public, go hand-in-hand

57. See Lenta, supra note 49, at 859.
58. Roger Trigg criticizes Ronal Dworkin’s distinction between “faith” and “reason” in
the sense that, according to Dworkin, faith (and therefore religion as well) cannot be rational.
TRIGG, supra note 3, at 34, 142, 145.
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with an understanding of reason as solely restricted to the public or
to common consensus. This negates the credibility of forms of
explanation emanating from groups of individuals sharing the same
core religious beliefs and interests.
Liberalist thinking in support of the strict separation between
the private (also being the domain of religion) and the public (as
excluding anything religious) ignores the fact that every individual
and all groups of individuals sharing a foundational common interest
are bearers and doers of some or other faith. It is not only religious
people who have faith. In the words of Iain Benson, “[T]o make
assumptions is to have faith of some sort.” 59 The public sphere can
therefore not escape practices of faith loyalties whether religious or
non-religious (or secular). What also requires mentioning here is
that science cannot tell us either why something exists or what the
ultimate purpose of something is. The question of ultimate causes
(or ends) is the jurisdiction of religion (and philosophy). 60 Faith
permeates all of reality, whether in education, scientific
experimentations or in the observations of astronomers. Faith is
exercised not only by the religious but also by the non-religious.
Reason does not manufacture moral criteria ex nihilo—it needs
something to work with. 61 In other words, reason is ultimately
based on some or other pre-suppositional or pre-rational point of
belief that lies in the transcendental realm of things. This has
implications for how we understand reason and the viability thereof.

59. Iain T. Benson, The Jurisdiction of Science: What the Evolution/Creation Debate is Not
About, 3 J. FOR CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP 1, 3 (2007).
60. Id. at 21.
61. SMITH, supra note 3, at 153. Steven D. Smith goes on to show that concepts (such as
“harm,” “equality,” “freedom,” and “human dignity” for example) are in many instances used by
theorists to vindicate a certain point of view regarding a moral matter, where it is impossible for
such conceptual view to escape subjectivity. Id. at 95. Smith explains for example that: “Liberals
and others use the harm principle to argue for their favored positions on questions of individual
freedom, often in the context of specific controversies over obscenity, regulation of sexual
conduct, abortion, or similar issues. But, reversing directions, they also use their favored
positions on issues of individual liberty to argue for understanding ‘harm’ in particular ways—
and for excluding from the category of ‘harm’ injuries that are in fact harmful in any ordinary
sense not skewed to reach (or avoid) particular favored (or disfavored) conclusions.” Id. at 95.
Applying this to the argument in this article, a concept such as “equality” is used by some
scholars as a point of rationality in qualifying the accommodation by religious associations of
certain forms of sexual conduct even where the practice of such sexual conduct is in opposition
to the core tenets of such an association. This is dealt with in more detail below.
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If faith permeates all of society (including the public) and if “fact”
has a faith dimension to it and also permeates all of society, then
reason is open to variation, depending on the specific religious and
faith basis relevant to a given situation. Also, reasoning from a
religious point of departure forms part of the dissemination of
religious belief. 62 This not only applies to the individual believer but
also to a group of believers sharing the same core beliefs and
interests.
Accompanying the importance of the protection of associational
rights is sensitivity towards the diversity of credible arguments on
certain moral matters. This is especially the case where such moral
matters form part of the core doctrine of a religious association.
Questions related to the prohibition of appointments by, or
membership to, religious associations of persons practicing same-sex
sexual conduct concern one such moral matter. The protection and
flourishing of civil society not only has to do with the protection and
flourishing of specific interests shared and practiced by a group of
believers, but also implies the accommodation of different forms of
rationality in qualifying specific practices that are unique to a specific
association. Liberalism’s staunch support of the public/private divide
serves as a metaphor for the dividing line between reason and
preference, where the public is understood as being governed by
reason. 63 Also, liberalism’s understanding of the individual as being
“the elementary unit of explanation” has difficulty assimilating the
religious other than in its individual dimensions. 64 Added to this,
religion falls on the private side of law’s conceptual divide, and once
so accepted, religion is viewed as being bound to preference and not
to reason. Consequently, religion is viewed as a matter of preference
(or choice), and as such, an expression of the autonomous

62. See, e.g., Lund v. Boissoin, 2012 ABCA 300, at ¶ 64 (Can.) (“A moral statement
arising out of religious conviction may, in some cases, be seen as the dissemination of religious
belief.”).
63. PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 120–23 (2005). The public is also
understood as the secular domain, which is viewed as a non-religious domain. In this regard,
secular grounds need not be more reliable than religious ones especially when dealing with
moral issues which are connoted to cultural grounds. Secular grounds can be corrupted as well.
BRYAN T. MCGRAW, FAITH IN POLITICS: RELIGION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 101 (2010). Secular
reasons can also come into conflict with one another. Id. at 102.
64. Berger, supra note 32, at 284–85.
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individual. 65 This has implications for how we understand the
parameters of the religious association’s expressions of conviction
and reason and whether a sense of reason should be excluded from
the religious group.
Jürgen Habermas refers to the “assumption of a common human
reason [which] forms the basis of justification for a secular state that
no longer depends on religious legitimation.” 66 It is this assumption
which, according to Habermas, makes the separation of state and
church possible at the institutional level. 67 This assumption of a
common reason has dire implications for the justificatory weight
stemming from religious modes of rationalization. The courts in
many instances fuel this assumption in their analysis of the
parameters of religious rights and freedoms. Habermas comments
that “[i]n the liberal view, the state guarantees citizens freedom of
religion only on the condition that religious communities, each from
the perspective of its own doctrinal tradition, accept not only the
separation of church and state, but also the restrictive definition of
the public use of reason.” 68 Many religious believers base their
decisions concerning fundamental matters of justice on their
religious convictions. The liberal state, which protects such forms of
life in terms of a basic right, then cannot at the same time expect all
citizens to justify their political statements independently of their
religious convictions (or world views) 69—“[t]he liberal state must
not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and
politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for those of
its citizens who follow a faith.” 70 Religious dialogue and forms of
reason have been subdued by the dominance of non-religious
language in Western liberal and democratic societies. Also, the more
theologians seek to find the means to translate theological
convictions into terms acceptable to the non-believer, the more they

65. Id. at 309–10.
66. Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 4 (2006).
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). Habermas states that the insight by secular citizens that
they live in a post-secular society that is epistemically adjusted to the continued existence of
religious communities in a post-secular society should include an understanding that their
conflict with religious opinions is a “reasonably expected disagreement.” Id. at 15.
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substantiate the view that theology has little of importance to say in
the area of ethics. 71 The result of this is also that religion is
becoming more and more undifferentiated from other forms of
belief. This has implications for the accommodation by the law and
the authorities of a religious association’s justification for
functioning in a certain manner.
Stephen Carter comments that what is needed is not a
requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue
that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism accept whatever form of
dialogue a member of the public offers. Carter warns that unless
liberal theory and liberal law develop a way to welcome the
religiously devout in public moral debate without first demanding
that they make themselves into different people, liberalism will
continue its slide from a pluralistic theory of politics to a narrow,
elitist theory of right results, and damned be those who try to block
the liberal path. 72 To assume that people should discuss public
policy based on shared moral premises is to assume that all
worldviews share basic moral premises. 73 According to Stanley Fish,
liberalism is:
[C]ommitted at once to allowing competing world views equal
access to its deliberative arena, and to disallowing the claims of any
one of them to be supreme, unless of course it is demonstrated to
be at all points compatible with the principles of reason. . . . The
one thing liberalism cannot do is put reason inside the battle where
it would have to contend with other adjudicative principles and

71. Stanley Hauerwas, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in THE HAUERWAS READER
51, 69 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001). In the words of Liliane Voyé, “Instead
of speaking of ‘the laws of God,’ ‘the rules of the church,’ more and more frequently
representatives of the Catholic Church refer to ‘human rights’ and to ‘human values,’ without
mentioning a specific doctrinal background.” Liliane Voyé, Secularization in a Context of Advanced
Modernity, 60 SOC. REL. 275, 278 (1999); see also RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 173 (1983). Habermas goes so far as to state
that religious citizens should be allowed to express and justify their convictions in a religious
language if they cannot find secular “translations” for them. Habermas, supra note 66, at 9–10.
72. Stephen L. Carter, Lecture Two: The Establishment Clause Mess, 69 OR. L. REV. 495, 524
(1990); see also Stephen L. Carter, Liberalism’s Religion Problem, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 2002),
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/liberalisms-religion-problem-14.
73. Christine L. Niles, Epistemological Nonsense? The Secular/Religious Distinction, 17 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 561, 576 (2003).
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where it could not succeed merely by invoking itself because its
own status would be what was at issue. 74

Jonathan Chaplin is of the view that separate secular reasons for
political views may not even be identifiable by religious believers,
and the very attempt to formulate principles to govern political life,
which can command the universal acceptance of all rational and
reasonable citizens, is, after all, a hopeless task. 75 John Rawl’s
commitment to overlapping consensus does not do much to improve
the integration of religious argument and consequent reasoning.
Rawls’ account of overlapping consensus represents, in spite of
Rawls’ disavowal of secularism, a commitment to an independent
ethic of autonomy that has no place for religious convictions. 76

74. Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn’t Exist, 36 DUKE L.J. 997, 997 (1987). Fish also states:
If you tell a serious Christian that no one can walk on water, rise from the dead, or
feed five thousand with two fishes and five loaves, he or she will tell you that the
impossibility of those actions for mere men is what makes their performance so
powerful a sign of divinity. For one party the reasoning is ‘No man can do it and
therefore Christ didn’t do it’; for the other the reasoning is ‘Since no man could do it,
he who did it is more than man.’ For one party falsification follows from the absence
of a plausibly empirical account of how the purported phenomena could have
occurred; for the other, the absence of a plausibly empirical account is just the point,
one that does not challenge the faith but confirms it.
Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2255, 2279, 2291 (1997). See also Carter, supra note 72, at 523. Carter also states, “It is a
commonplace of public dialogue in our current era—at least among elites—to treat religionists
working for change as presumptively fanatical, not amenable to reason. In the first half of the
nineteenth century, the abolitionists, too, were described as fanatics.” STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S
NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 97 (2000).
75. Jonathan Chaplin, Beyond Liberal Restraint: Defending Religiously-Based Arguments in Law
and Public Policy, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 617, 640 (2000). See also RESCHER, supra note 9, at 10.
76. STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGES AND THE
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 176–77 (2007). On the one hand, Rawls believes that he is doing justice to
the comprehensive character of differing fundamental views of life by seeking to build political
agreement only on the “overlapping” consensus that exists among all of them. On the other
hand, as Rawls moves toward the construction of that overlapping consensus, he argues that
differing comprehensive views should “give way in public life” in order to allow the common,
political conception to become “freestanding.” What, according to James Skillen, finally becomes
freestanding in Rawls’s construction, however, looks very much like something quite compatible
with Rawls’s own comprehensive liberal view of life and not so much like something that
overlaps comfortably with many other comprehensive religions and philosophies? James W.
Skillen, The Theoretical Roots of Equal Treatment, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 55, 69 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998). See also
SMITH, supra note 3, 14–15.
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Public discourse, says Steven Smith, is impoverished because of the
limitations emanating from secular rationalism which prevent an
unveiling of fundamental normative commitments, which eventually
results in a superficial discourse. 77 These are but some of the
indicators confirming that religious reasons for religious
commitments are sidelined by the dominance of non-religious
thinking and reasoning within Western liberalist societies. This has
implications for how the religious association’s reasons for acting in
certain ways are understood.

B. Religious Associations and Reason
The question that arises against the background of appointments
by, or appointments to, religious associations in the context of those
who practice same-sex sexual conduct (which is in opposition to the
core tenets of such an association) is the following: At what point
will freedom of association and religious liberty have to give way to
the right to freedom from discrimination? Stated otherwise: When
does the freedom to associate (or the right to religious practice and
expression) guarantee a legitimate right to discriminate? In
beginning to answer this, it may be possible to postulate some or
other universally rational and coherent explanation. However, the
rational aspect will soon begin to mutate into different forms of
rationality. Who would disagree with the view that many religious
and non-religious believers, cultures and religious associations in
South Africa (and elsewhere) have, as part of their core belief,
requirements pertaining to sexual conduct that are inextricably
connected to foundational views on marriage, family, child-rearing
and purpose in life? Human rights jurisprudence supports the
sacredness of the human body, the protection of which is prioritized
by human rights instruments around the world. Irrespective of race,
creed or culture, the living (and dead) human body is sacrosanct.
The creeds of, for example, the mainstream religions in South Africa
are in agreement with this. Questions as to how and for what
purposes we use our bodies are therefore of fundamental concern
and naturally overlap with our foundational beliefs and consequently
also with our right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion.

77. SMITH, supra note 3, at 211, 215, 218.
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The autonomy of religious associations and their independence
from the state are vital to a conscience-honoring social order. The
state’s interference therefore should be limited to protecting
vulnerable members from readily discernible, serious harm (for
example, physical or sexual abuse of a child, or financial fraud by
church officials), not from moral claims that the political community
rejects.78 The manner in which we use our bodies (including sexual
activities) overlaps with our individual identity, introducing the
relevance of this for the fruition of our human dignity. The way we
think of our bodies and the purposes for which our bodies are to be
used (including sexual activities) according to each of our beliefs,
overlaps with our moral views on the matter (whether driven by
genetic influences or not)—moral views which differ from believer to
believer and from group of believers to group of believers. Genetic
reasons for sexual arousal are not limited to reasons for same-sex
sexual conduct but apply to other types of sexual conduct as well.
This however does not rid forms of sexual conduct from loyalty to
specific moral positions for the reason already explained. 79 If samesex sexual conduct is enforced upon society then why should other
types of sexual conduct such as “an affiliation of someone in ageminority and someone in age-majority who claim the right to be
equal and therefore married in spite of current prohibitions on age
limitations” 80 (to name only one example) not be enforced on
society? Here too reasons provided for having same-sex sexual
conduct enforced upon society whilst supporting a prohibition
against marriage between someone who is in age-minority and

78. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 308 (2010).
79. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2000 BCCA 519, at ¶ 20 (Can.)
(“Some aspects of human sexuality remain morally controversial including homosexual or ‘same
sex’ relationships. The division of moral conviction on this subject cuts across society and
divides religious communities as well as people of no religious persuasion. The moral position of
some on all sides of particular issues will be influenced by their religion, others not. There is no
bright line between a religious and non-religious conscience. Law may be concerned with
morality but the sources of morality in conscience are outside of the law’s range and should be
acknowledged from a respectful distance.”).
80. Robert J. Araujo, Same-Sex Marriage—From Privacy to Equality: The Failure of the
“Equality” Justifications for Same-Sex Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 195, 203 (Scott FitzGibbon et al. eds., 2010).
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someone who is in age-majority will not be accepted by everyone in
society. Sensitivity and an accommodative approach regarding
differing moral opinions on the body against the background of
sexual conduct is reflected in South African legislation that even
allows for marriage officers, for example, not to serve before
marriages between same-sex couples when such officers
conscientiously object to doing so. In this regard, there should be a
fair amount of agreement 81 amongst competing forms of belief and
religion regarding the differences of opinion on acceptable forms of
sexual conduct; but as the debate develops, so do the possibilities of
disagreement, and this despite efforts towards avoiding
disagreement. It is at this stage that one needs to become attentive
towards the different forms of reasoning. In what follows are three
examples of where the religious association’s conviction that
membership and appointments to itself should conform to its core
tenets pertaining to sexual conduct (otherwise such membership and
appointments will be prohibited) is opposed along lines of language
that assumes universal rationality. 82
The first example is that of “biological inherency.” Here the
reasoning is that because one is born with an inherent attraction to
persons of the same sex, a religious association may not prohibit
such a person from being a member of a religious community where
such a person practices same-sex sexual conduct and where such
conduct is in opposition to the core tenets of a religious association.
81. But even here there can be disagreement. For example, those who view the
prohibition of discrimination due to sexual orientation as an encompassing norm to be applied
by religious associations as well will already disagree at this stage with the rationale provided for
in the above. Likewise, there might be those religious associations whose members would
directly resort to religious language regarding a justification for the approach taken by such an
association in prohibiting membership to someone due to the latter’s conduct resulting from his
or her specific form of sexual orientation. The importance of this is elaborated upon below in the
context of Alvin Esau’s “organic model” as an example.
82. Note here the similarities when referring to South African scholarship on religious
associational rights in the context of sexual conduct, where we find parallels to the examples of
assumed universal rationality grounded in “biological inherency,” “possibilities of employment,”
and “equality understood as an encompassing norm prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation.” More specifically, as stated earlier, David Bilchitz assumes that equality should
include the encompassing norm of prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and
relies strongly on the “biological inherency” of sexual orientation as countering discrimination
resulting from this. Patrick Lenta on the other hand places the emphasis on practical
considerations related to “economic opportunity” and therefore that employment figures be
considered as well.
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This is an example of what Stephen Carter refers to as matters of
empirical morality, meaning that which is couched in terms of appeal
to values so overarching that no one would dispute them. Moral
dialogue of this type seems easier for liberal courts to accept, where
the judge is not supposed to impose her own moral judgments, but
she can certainly manage the facts. 83 Carter explains, by way of an
example, that empirical morality is viewed as the effort by the gay
rights movement to portray homosexuality as innate rather than
chosen. The innateness claim has the advantage of inviting equal
protection scrutiny of restrictions on conduct that can be seen as
disadvantaging a particular sexual preference. However, says Carter,
as a constitutional (or for that matter a moral) issue it is difficult to
see why it ought to matter whether sexual preference is a choice or
whether it is something innate. 84
Such rationality relying on biological inherency does not take
cognizance of other rational approaches emanating from other
foundational points of belief. As explained earlier, human rights
jurisprudence supports the sacredness of the human body, the
protection of which is prioritized by human rights instruments
around the world. Irrespective of race, creed or culture, the living
(and dead) human body is sacrosanct. Questions as to how and for
what purposes we use our bodies are therefore of fundamental
concern and naturally overlap with our foundational beliefs and
consequently our right to freedom of religion, belief, and opinion.
This means that biological inherency as reason for specific forms of
conduct can be trumped by other forms of reasoning. 85
These different reasons in justifying or prohibiting certain types
of conduct also lurk beneath the balancing efforts to be found
between conflicting rights. 86 A second example of where non-

83. Carter, supra note 13, at 481–82.
84. Id. at 483.
85. There are also other forms of criticism that can be added to this, for example, whether
the assumed rationality of biological inherency trumps forms of reasoning that support the
organic model of associational loyalties such as that which Alvin Esau refers to. See Esau, supra
note 54, at 734. In other words, how persuasive is this application of biological inherency when
compared to other forms of reasoning?
86. Needless to say, where there is a serious violation of a human right, such as the
taking of life or the exercise of physical (or psychological) harm or the threat of taking a life or of
causing physical (and psychological) harm, then the reasons as to what right should be
prioritized involves a simpler determination as to which right should be prioritized.
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religious reasons are viewed as trumping religious reasons pertaining
to membership or appointments to a religious association is the
following: Looking at the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) pertaining to decisions taken by the
German labor courts related to sexual conduct and the consequent
dismissal by church institutions of persons that conducted
extramarital relations, Van der Vyver observes that the ECtHR
judgments added a particular dimension to the principles that
Germany is required to demand of its labor courts; namely, the
effects of dismissal of an employee, for whatever reason, on the
personal and family life of the employee, among other things. 87 In
this regard, the question needs to be asked as to what, from a
rational point of view, trumps “personal and family life,” for
example, over that of the religious rights and right to human dignity
of the members of a religious institution as well as the associational
rights of such an institution? 88 In Schüth v. Germany 89 the ECtHR
pertinently stated that:
[T]he fact that an employee dismissed by an ecclesiastical employer
has limited possibilities of finding new employment is decisive.
This is all the more significant where the employer holds a
dominant position in a given sector . . . or where the training of a
dismissed employee bore such a specific nature that it would be
difficult if not impossible for him to find new employment outside
of the church. 90

Here, “family related concerns” (concerns related to privacy) and
the “limited possibility of finding new employment,” form part of
the reasons given by the ECtHR so as to uphold the employment of
an employee in a religious association. This reasoning therefore
87. Van der Vyver, supra note 7, at 8. More specifically, these involved disputes related to
dismissal by church institutions of persons who had conducted extramarital relationships.
88. In this regard, Roger Trigg comments that the right to respect for privacy trumped
any right a religious institution had to demand that its employees live by its principles:
This demand for equal respect, and recognition of equal dignity, ensures that
institutions have little say, even in ensuring that their teaching is observed by their
own employees. The result is that there is no respect for the particular ethos of a
church or other religious institution, and indifference as to whether a religion can
continue to uphold its principles through example and teaching.
TRIGG, supra note 3, at 120.
89. (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 32 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts.).
90. Id. at ¶ 73.
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overrides the religious association’s opposition to extramarital
sexual conduct by its members or employees. The question arising
from this is whether such reasons presented by the ECtHR should
trump the reasoning of the church, which in this case involves the
“entering into a marriage void within the understanding of the faith
and Canonic Code of the Church”? 91 However, what rationally
trumps the “limited possibility of finding new employment” over
that of the associational rights of a religious association? 92
A third example of assumed universal rationality is that
regarding the concept of “equality” and its assumed qualification of
an encompassing application of the prohibition of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. An example of this is Justice Basson’s
finding in the Strydom judgment that the South African
Constitution’s right to equality is foundational to the open and
democratic society envisaged by the Constitution, and therefore that,
as a general principle, the Constitution should counteract rather
than reinforce unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual
orientation. 93 Kent Greenawalt points to problems of understanding
arising from the puzzling nature of equality, one of them being the
“uncertainty among lawyers and judges about the significance of
legal norms formulated in the language of equality.” 94 Religion is an
equality right itself and religious people are entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment in terms of their religion as well. Placing
equality and non-discrimination over against religion, or viewing
some forms of non-discrimination (say, same-sex sexual conduct) as

91. Id. at ¶ 38.
92. Here again added criticism can be added; for example, how persuasive will this
argument be to those who are persuaded by the belief and consequent rationality connected to
viewing heterosexual sexual conduct and marriage as a Godly sacrament? Also, how will the
argument supporting “possibilities of employment” rationally override the interests related to
Alvin Esau’s organic model? See Esau, supra 54 at 734–35.
93. Strydom, [2008] ZAEQC at ¶ 14. As explained above, the Strydom judgment
emphasized the superiority of the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation
where the appointment made by a religious association is not connected to a core religious
function or to spiritual leadership within such an association. This however, does not negate the
strong message by Justice Basson in support of the prohibition of unfair discrimination due to
sexual orientation as an encompassing norm.
94. Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167
(1983). For different conceptions on equality, including equality as the right to flourish, see
Robert J. Araujo, What is Equality? Arguing the Reality and Dispelling the Myth: An Inquiry in a Legal
Definition for the American Context, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 113, 169–70 (2009).
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more important than the religious person’s freedom to disagree with
the associational acceptance of same-sex sexual conduct, is
questionable. Roger Trigg asks: “How is it that we now believe in
Western democracies in the equality of all, when many in the
contemporary world still do not? It may be a constituent belief of
democracy, but what justifies it?” 95 Trigg then adds that
acknowledgment of equality need not imply uniform treatment. 96
Robert Araujo states
[W]e often hear claims made about “inclusiveness” that are
deemed essential by some advocates to make each person “equal”
with all others, notwithstanding the diversity that differentiates
among them in some significant ways. This kind of equality,
however, tends to be contrived. . . . The argument for these
equalities is false and unsustainable because it removes the claim to
equality from the two foundational pillars of fact and the
transcendent or metaphysical nature of the human person. It
represents an attempt to do away with distinction and
employs . . . a misuse of the law that grants a license to equality
in spite of what reason and reality declare that it is not. 97

Trigg also states, “Discrimination in favour of religious views
will seem as unacceptable as discriminating against some other
group. Yet, although ‘discrimination’ has become a powerful label
for unacceptable behaviour, it is worth remembering that every

95. TRIGG, supra note 3, at 2.
96. Id. at 4. Justice Albie Sachs formerly of the Constitutional Court of South Africa:
[E]quality should not be confused with uniformity; in fact, uniformity can be the
enemy of equality. Equality means equal concern and respect across difference. It does
not pre-suppose the elimination or suppression of difference. Respect for human
rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality therefore does
not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour but an acknowledgment and
acceptance of difference.
Nat’l Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, [1998] ZACC 15, at ¶ 132
(CCT) (S. Afr.). Stuart Woolman refers to the South African Constitutional Court’s view in
Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education that the essence of equality under the
South African Constitution is that “we treat everyone with equal concern and respect,”
Woolman responding that this is “just a fancy way of saying that we need not all act the same
way in order to enjoy the benefits—including the associational benefits—of a liberal
constitution.” WOOLMAN, supra note 23, at 64.
97. Araujo, supra note 94, at 170. In similar fashion Roger Trigg comments that “[s]ecular
thinking, caught up with issues concerning equality and non-discrimination, treats its own views
as superior to those of any religion.” TRIGG, supra note 3, at 133.
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rational judgement, and indeed every moral judgement, involves
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant factors.” 98 This gives
discrimination a wider, more acceptable tone, where differences in
rational approaches inherently exclude or discriminate against one
another as a result of differences in belief. Therefore, to assume that
the prohibition of unfair discrimination due to sexual orientation
trumps a religious association’s reasoning in support of the
sacredness of heterosexual marriage is erroneous.
In the examples above where “biological inherency,”
“possibilities of unemployment,” and “equality understood as
including the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual
orientation” are used as assumed rational points in countering the
upholding of the associational rights of a religious institution (and
the religious rights and rights to human dignity of its members), the
question remains as to whether these examples rationally override
other (including religious) forms of persuasion. The answer to this is
surely not in the affirmative.
The first part of this article referenced three main streams of
thought arising from South African jurisprudence pertaining to the
parameters of a religious association in allowing membership or
appointments to itself in the context of forms of sexual conduct that
are in opposition to such an association’s core tenets. In this regard,
David Bilchitz’s reliance on the prohibition of unfair discrimination
based on sexual orientation as an encompassing norm and his
inclusion of “biological inherency” so as to support this view, and
Patrick Lenta’s reliance on “economic opportunity” were critically
investigated in the second part of this article against the background
of assumed rational qualifications emanating from sources external
to that of the religious association itself. From this, the question
arises of whether reasons presented by a religious association, such
as that of Esau’s organic model, are to be subordinated to opposing
reasons based on, for example, biological inherency, the
accommodation of sexual orientation as an encompassing norm,
economic opportunity, opportunities of employment, and privacy.
The ideal towards persuasion in obtaining harmony amongst
individuals and entities within civil society should not imply
uniformity of persuasion, due to the fact (and as explained in the
98. TRIGG, supra note 3, at 4.
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above) that there are different forms of language (religious and nonreligious) and reasoning in society which justify certain modes of
operation and functioning by individuals and groups sharing the
same interests in society.
Specifically focusing on the accommodation of same-sex sexual
conduct by a religious association whose core doctrine is in
opposition to such conduct, it was argued along the lines of general
persuasion that such accommodation should be allowed due to the
central role that sexual relationships play in our existence and
purpose in life. This in itself provides a reasoned argument that
should appeal to society in general (which in turn should allow the
necessary autonomy to religious associations in deciding its
approach). This reasoned argument is further enhanced by
questioning the rationality of certain non-religious points of view
(such as biological inherency) when compared to some religious
points of view (such as that which arises from the organic model).
The rationality of the religious foundational ethos illustrated, in for
example, Alvin Esau’s organic model cannot be overridden by a
perceived to be universally persuasive form of rationality (based on a
non-religious pre-rational point of departure) and therefore should
not be assumed to be less rational than other non-religious
reasoning pertaining to important moral beliefs (provided of course
that the public peace and order, as well as the fundamental tenets
related to the protection of human dignity are not violated). These
two forms of reasoning support a religious association’s right to
prohibit membership or appointments of persons who participate in
same-sex sexual conduct, where such conduct is in opposition to
such a religious association’s core doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article argues for the prioritization of religious associational
rights as well as a better understanding of reason inherent to a
religious association (and which is of consequent persuasion to the
members of such association). This takes place against the
background of recent developments in South African jurisprudence,
specifically concerning membership and appointments to a religious
association in the context of a certain form of sexual conduct that is
opposed to the core tenets of such an association. Recent scholarship
in South Africa is reflective of different and sometimes contrasting
views. The view taken by this article is one which supports the
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awarding of a proper level of autonomy to a religious association in
deciding on the acceptance or rejection of certain forms of sexual
conduct, where same-sex sexual conduct is the specific focus. In
addition to emphasizing the importance of religious associational
rights, this article addressed different forms of reasoning (both
religious and non-religious) regarding membership or appointments
to religious associations of persons participating in same-sex sexual
conduct. Here, this article presents both a reasoned argument that
houses general appeal due to its reliance on the important role that
certain forms of sexual conduct play in enhancing our sense of
meaning and purpose for existence and an argument that questions
the universal rationality of certain non-religious reasons that purport
to have universal persuasion. This in turn establishes a more
nuanced and accommodative understanding regarding religious
reasons for prohibiting certain forms of sexual conduct when dealing
with membership and appointments.
Forms of belief (and consequent persuasion) in moral matters
related to the acceptance or rejection of forms of sexual conduct are
varied and, as stated earlier, in many instances directly opposed to
one another. Underlying these forms of persuasion, whether
religious or non-religious, are pre-suppositional or pre-rational
points of departure that rest on some or other belief. These beliefs
provide specific and differing interpretations of concepts such as
equality, harm, freedom, and human dignity, and in turn, of whether
certain forms of sexual conduct are acceptable or not. Therefore,
religious associations should have a high level of autonomy in
decisions on moral matters (in this case, matters related to same-sex
sexual conduct) not only because of the idea that the right to
freedom of association is a foundational norm but also due to the
fact that the reasoning emanating from such associations are, on
closer analysis, just as competitive as non-religious forms of
reasoning. This in turn strengthens the autonomous nature that
should accompany religious associations. Consequently, this will be
constructive towards the furtherance of diversity in pluralist and
democratic societies. Roger Trigg, in the context of discrimination
on grounds of same-sex sexual conduct comments that neither side
should assume the other to be so wicked that they have to be
constrained by the law. The issue is not which side is right, but
whether there is a genuine moral discussion to be had and whether a
right to religious freedom must always be “trumped” by other
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considerations. 99 It is not only questions related to same-sex sexual
conduct and its accommodation by religious associations that is at
issue here, but other forms of sexual conduct as well, such as sexual
conduct resulting from polygamous and pre-marital relationships, for
instance. A more nuanced sense of autonomy for religious
associations together with sensitivity towards the credibility of
reasoning by religious associations (in opposition to allowing
membership or appointments to those persons who practice sexual
conduct which is in opposition to the core tenets of such an
association) should assist in furthering the tenuous and challenging
quest (which is laden with complexities) towards a fair balance in
the conflict between the right to equal treatment and the right to
religious freedom in a pluralist and democratic society.

99. Id. at 94.
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